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Abstract 
This paper inventories strategies for maintaining affordable housing toward perpetuity in hot 
markets in an increasing number of locales. Long-term affordable housing strategies answer 
the call to make affordable housing resources last longer as federal funding for affordable 
housing diminishes, rental affordability programs expire, and owners prematurely buy their 
way out of affordable mortgages. The need is especially acute in hot-market cities, like New 
York City, that have seen large development programs end without any adequate replace-
ments. The strategies span rental and homeownership delivery mechanisms, subsidy and 
equity sharing, cooperatives and community governance, land regulation, extending existing 
termed programs, and amassing funds to sustain affordable housing, with a focus on 
producing long-term affordable units through inclusionary zoning. Interviews with national 
policymakers and experienced affordable and mixed-income housing developers bring new 
light to the success of these mechanisms.  
This study finds that neither relying on inclusionary zoning nor extending affordable housing 
programs should be considered a replacement for federal subsidies. Innovating new programs 
means setting numbers of units produced against longevity, affordability and occupants’ 
capacity to generate equity. Recommendations are given first in terms of challenges, ten-
sions, trade-offs and new questions that these strategies create, and then to specific actors in 
the policymaking arena. Nonprofits should focus on monitoring long-term affordability and 
accountability. Municipalities and local governments should better regulate sources and uses 
of housing trust funds, focus on helping fund first-time homebuyers, consider input from 
local developers, consider long-term inclusionary zoning regulation, and monitor produc-
tivity and long-term regulation. Policymakers and researchers should consider why potential 
homebuyers have selected riskier subprime mortgage products over more secure equity-
sharing products and might want to better advertise equity-sharing options. Finally, New 
York City should expand its voluntary inclusionary program to more neighborhoods and 
better track its production and longevity. 
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I. Study Aims and Goals 
This paper aims to describe policies for long-term affordable housing in an accessible form, 
compare long-term policy options both for creating long-term programs and extending 
existing programs, and focus on the increasingly significant issues of homeownership and 
inclusionary zoning in hot markets. Inclusionary Zoning (IZ) is a supply-side strategy for hot 
markets in which a specified percentage of a development is produced as affordable housing, 
usually as part of a density bonus. Municipalities are increasingly exploring the strategy as a 
means to regulate affordable housing tenures for 30 years to perpetuity. 
II. Introduction 
As federal funding for affordable housing has diminished since the 1980s, cities and states 
are vigorously seeking ways to stretch the tenure of their affordable-housing investments. 
This increasing interest in “long-term affordable housing” echoes the ongoing changes in 
housing funding and the shortcomings of existing affordable programs in hot-market 
locations. Displacement is a growing problem, as many of the 10-, 15-, 20-, and 25-year 
rental affordability programs that were created in the 1980s expire or as owners prematurely 
buy their way out of affordable mortgages in order to take advantage of the hot real estate 
market. With federal funding from the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) decreasing, and multiyear waitlists for voucher-based Section 8 subsidies, supply-side 
place-based units have become the growing sector of affordable housing development. States 
and municipalities have fewer resources to build affordable housing and greater interest in 
sustaining it. This paper will inventory policy mechanisms, with a focus on homeownership, 
that exist for longer terms than traditional programs, discuss their inherent tensions, and 
consider input from national policymakers and housing developers on how to productively 
structure long-term and inclusionary affordable housing policies. 
Context and Relevance 
As funding for development and preservation dwindles and as for-profit developers buy 
themselves out of affordability agreements to take advantage of hot real estate markets, local 
government housing authorities seek opportunities to make lasting investments in affordable 
housing. HUD-funded municipal affordable-housing investments are replacing traditionally 
sponsored housing development for individuals of moderate income (80% area median 
income), low income (60% AMI) and very-low incomes (30% AMI). The public housing and 
Section 8 programs were conceived in perpetuity, but the last decade has found city housing 
authorities converting some public housing properties to the market while funds for Section 8 
continue to shrink per capita. The most formidable funding source today for new affordable 
housing on the national level is the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), which funds 
affordable rental properties. Most states use a Housing Finance Agency (HFA) to set the 
guidelines for bidding on their scarce supply of tax credits. The federally regulated LIHTC 
tenure is 15 years; however, some states have imposed longer regulation requirements. Long-
term affordable-housing programs are particularly relevant to investigate because they 
answer the call for an affordable housing source to supplement or replace the insufficient 
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supply of expiring federally- and locally-financed affordable housing with new mechanisms 
capable of stretching the tenure of new affordable housing and sustaining mixed-income 
communities. Two policy vehicles for long-term local affordability of particular growing 
interest today are inclusionary zoning ordinances and community land trusts, both of which 
more communities are using to regulate affordability toward perpetuity. 
Declining Supplies of Affordable Housing in Hot Markets 
Despite the efforts of many cities, affordable units are being lost at a rate far faster than they 
can be created. New York City provides a good example when discussing affordability, given 
its broad array of expiring affordable programs and lack of affordability at nearly every 
income stratum. Many affordable housing buildings were erected since the 1960s, and most 
buildings built before 1974 are likely to contain rent-regulated units. For the first time in 
decades, since 2000 New York City has many record years of new residential construction. 
Despite this growth in the overall stock, increases in the luxury housing supply has led to a 
decrease in the affordable housing supply, defined as units affordable to households spending 
30 percent or less of their income on housing. New York City lost over 32,340 units of 
privately owned rental-subsidized housing between 1990 and 2005,1 at a rate of 2,000 to 
6,000 units nearly every year since 1997.2 The loss includes the sale of Manhattan’s biggest 
affordable developments in 2006, Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village, together 
making up 11,232 units. MetLife, which built and sold these complexes to Tishman Speyer 
for $5.4 billion, estimated that by 2018, 70 percent of its units would be deregulated from 
rent stabilization, compared with 30 percent in 2006.3 Rent stabilization, New York state’s 
successor to New York City’s nearly defunct rent control policies, governs rent increases 
until individual units crest at a $2,000 per month ceiling or a household’s income exceeds 
$175,000. In 2006 Starrett City Associates also tried to sell Starrett City, a 5,881-unit 
development in Brooklyn, the largest Mitchell-Lama project. The New York City and state 
affordable-housing programs lost 24,000 units before 2004, and 26,000 more since as 
buildings leave the program.4 Real estate values escalating faster than incomes rendered an 
additional 205,000 units unaffordable to households making 80 percent of AMI ($50,000 for 
a family of four) between 2002 and 2005.5 New York’s statistics are representative of the 
national scene, where 1.2 million rental units with monthly rents below $400 were lost 
between 1993 and 2003.6  
New York City can provide lessons for all hot markets. It has far more robust subsidized 
affordable-housing development programs than any other American city, and precedent-
setting experience tracking expiring units and monitoring displacement problems. Today the 
                                                 
1 Community Service Society of New York, May 22, 2007; www.cssny.org/news/releases/2007_0522.html. 
2 Community Service Society of New York, “Policy Brief: Closing the Door,” Figure 1, May 2006. 
3 New York Times, “Complexes’ Seller Pushes Profits, as Critics Fear High Rents,” Sept. 23, 2006. 
4 New York City Comptroller, “Affordable No More: An Update,” May 26, 2006. 
5 Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development, “Housing Preservation as Important as New 
Construction,” in Public Advocate for the City of New York, Twelve for 2030: Responses to PlaNYC, April 
2007; www.pubadvocate.nyc.gov/policy/documents/Gotbaum_2030_response.pdf.  
6 Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies, State of the Nation’s Housing 2005, “Measuring the Nation’s 
Rental Housing Affordability Problems,” June 2005, p. 41.  
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city is striving to add 165,000 new units to its affordable supply by 2013 as part of its 
PlaNYC initiative. As municipalities work to develop affordable housing stock nationwide, 
they can learn from New York City’s dilemmas involving expiring units.  
The Daunting Task of Preservation 
The task of preserving units building by building is a heroic undertaking, one that requires 
convincing a developer to give up the higher rents they speculated they would obtain in a hot 
market. Over the last decade, many affordable housing developers bought themselves out of 
affordable mortgages early so that they could take advantage of the market. Rather than only 
pursue preservation efforts, advocates are looking to long-term affordability mechanisms, 
such as extending affordability tenure guidelines under inclusionary zoning. This paper 
investigates the policies and ideas that have been suggested to implement this housing 
mechanism, and finds that they may be more complicated than advocates would prefer. 
The Search for Affordable Housing: Gentrification, Displacement, Migration 
The search for affordable housing today is the probable cause of the “greatest population 
redistribution since the dust bowl…‘more significant than the migrations of the 1950s or 
1970s.’”7 The Harvard State of the Nation’s Housing 2007 report states that “affordability 
problems remain the nation’s fastest-growing and most pervasive housing challenge.”8 
Current typical searches for affordable housing take lower-income households from 
gentrified urban neighborhoods to the exurban fringe, and from foreclosed homes generally 
to rental or regulated affordable housing. In 2006, outer suburbs of hot market cities — 
notably in California, home of most of the nation’s hottest housing markets — saw the fastest 
rates of population growth.9 (In 2007, analysts predict a slowdown in migration to 
California.10) Housing can still sometimes be built at prices affordable to those with moderate 
incomes in exurban locations where land is cheaper, but exurban locations have the drawback 
of having the highest average commuting costs. However, for most moderate-income 
Americans, finding affordable housing is becoming an economic impossibility for the simple 
reason that “slow growth in wages for households in the bottom three-quarters of the income 
distribution is not keeping pace with escalating housing costs.”11 Creating “workforce 
housing” for “working families,” meaning affordable housing for teachers, police, and other 
residents who make cities function is receiving political, real estate, and policy backing.12 
                                                 
7 Forbes, “The Great American Migration,” 7/16/07, www.forbes.com/2007/07/16/suburbs-growth-housing-
forbeslife-cx_mw_0716migration.html; USA Today, “Pennsylvania Officials Concerned about Migration from 
New Jersey,” July 15, 2007, www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-07-15-altoona_N.htm.  
8 Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies, State of the Nation’s Housing 2007, press release at the National 
Low Income Housing Coalition, www.nlihc.org/detail/article.cfm?article_id=4261&id=61. 
9 Forbes, “America’s Fastest Growing Suburbs,” July 16, 2007, 
www.forbes.com/forbeslife/2007/07/16/suburbs-growth-housing-forbeslife-cx_mw_0716realestate_2.html.  
10 Bruce Norris Group, June 21, 2007, www.rismedia.com/wp/2007-06-21/expert-says-californias-real-estate-
crisis-will-be-worse-than-most-analysts-realize.  
11 Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies, “Affordability Problems Escalate Even as Housing Market Cools,” 
June 13, 2006, www.ksg.harvard.edu/ksgnews/PressReleases/061306_sonh.htm.  
12 The Urban Land Institute founded its initiative on Workforce Housing in summer 2007: 
www.uli.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Research/Initiatives/WorkforceHousing/Workforce_Housing.htm; 
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Many housing policymakers have taken great note of today’s domestic migrations. What is 
clear today is that in hot markets, subsidies have become necessary for low-income and 
workforce households to be able to live near their workplaces.  
Progressively minded jurisdictions, many of which are in coastal hot markets, have been 
tending to adopt housing policies with the intention of building mixed-income communities. 
Many of these mixed-income communities have also adopted inclusionary zoning or other 
long-term affordability measures.  
                                                                                                                                                       
National Housing Conference/Center for Housing Policy “Housing America’s Working Families” series 2003–
2006, www.nhc.org/index/chp-research-projects.  
Long-Term Affordable Housing Strategies in Hot Housing Markets 
  May 2008 5 
III. Methodology 
Research informing this study include the following: 
• Literature search 
• Interviews housing policy professionals 
• Interviews national developers with experience building affordable housing 
Definitions  
Long Term: For the purposes of this paper, 30 years or more will be considered “long term,” 
taking as precedents expiring rental Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) projects built 
by private, for-profit developers with regulated tenures of 10, 15, 20, and 25 years. 
Rhetorically, goal-oriented definitions are more useful; for example, “homeownership 
programs that keep units affordable to subsequent buyers,” or “subsidized-unit programs that 
avoid displacement,” potentially in perpetuity. These definitions allow many more types and 
durations of programs to fit under the rubric of long-term affordability and to inventory 
comprehensively their sets of workable policies. 
Shared Equity: Long-term homeownership programs are based on equity-recapture or 
equity-retention provisions, which either recapture the initial subsidy amount or grow the 
subsidy to keep the unit affordable to subsequent buyers without new additional gap 
financing. Subsidy retention, pioneered by researcher Rick Jacobus of the Burlington (VT) 
Community Land Trust in 2001, is the focus of many of the shared-equity policy reports 
written by national housing policy organizations in 2006 and 2007.13 (Following a merger 
with Lake Champlain Housing Development Corporation in October 2006, the Burlington 
Community Land Trust is now known as the Champlain Housing Trust.) 
Shared-appreciation mortgages, shared-equity mortgages, limited-equity cooperatives and 
community land trusts are the best examples of programs based on shared-equity models. 
They assign homeowners an equity cap, or tie equity to a market index like area median 
income (AMI). They aim to give homebuyers a home that they could not otherwise afford, 
and with reasonable potential for equity growth, in exchange for avoiding the risk of 
potentially dangerous or potentially risky subprime mortgages.14 
Inclusionary Zoning (or Inclusionary Housing): This involves policies on a neighborhood, 
municipal, or state scale that require or use incentives to encourage a percentage of set-aside 
affordable development for housing projects above a minimum threshold size. These policies 
are described in greater length below.  
                                                 
13 John Emmeus Davis, “Shared Equity Homeownership: The Changing Landscape of Resale-Restricted, 
Owner-Occupied Housing,” NHI 2006; Rick Jacobus and Jeffrey Lubbell, “Shared Equity, Transformative 
Wealth,” NHC 2007; Caplin et al., “Shared-Equity Mortgages, Housing Affordability and Ownership,” Fannie 
Mae Foundation, 2007.  
14 Interview with Jim Gray, National Cooperative Bank: Capital Impacts, Washington, DC, August 24, 2007. 
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Mortgage-Interest Tax Deduction: By far the nation’s largest housing subsidy is the 
mortgage-interest tax deduction, administered by the Internal Revenue Service. Designed to 
encourage investment in homes, the program has no cap. In 2006, deductions worth an 
estimated $76 billion were claimed by homeowners of all income strata,15 roughly 120 times 
the amount spent on the LIHTC program. Over half of the deductions went to the 12 percent 
of taxpayers with incomes over $100,000. This program is not usually thought of an afford-
able housing subsidy, but the federal tax structure does clearly reward homeownership. The 
result is the unquestioned goal of increasing the homeownership rate. One recent unfortunate 
consequence of that policy has been the rise of predatory lenders targeting people who do not 
understand or cannot afford the financial products they are purchasing.  
Hot Housing Markets: Affordable-housing developments, and their long-term affordable-
housing regulation systems, are most common in hot housing markets, where housing 
affordable for households making at or less than the local AMI is not available. Table 1 
shows the least affordable housing markets in 2006, as determined by comparing median 
house price to median household income.16 Los Angeles leads many California Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) markets as the least affordable. New York City, the source of the 
above statistics, is not nearly the least affordable MSA. Notably, most of the 29 MSAs 
(among the 105 MSAs tracked) that are above the national average affordability ratio of 4.6 
are on the East or West Coast, or in growing Sun Belt regions. 
Figure 1: Least Affordable Hot Housing Markets, 2006 
Los Angeles–Long Beach–Santa Ana CA MSA 10 
San Francisco–Oakland-Fremont CA MSA 9.8 
San Diego–Carlsbad–San Marcos CA MSA 9.5 
San Jose–Sunnyvale–Santa Clara CA MSA 8.9 
Honolulu HI MSA 8.6 
Riverside–San Bernardino–Ontario CA MSA 7.6 
Miami–Fort Lauderdale–Miami Beach FL MSA 7.2 
New York–Northern New Jersey–Long Island NY-NJ-PA MSA 7.1 
Sarasota-Bradenton-Venice FL MSA 6.7 
Sacramento-Arden-Arcade-Roseville CA MSA 6.5 
Reno-Sparks NV MSA 6.3 
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk CT MSA 6.3 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue WA MSA 6.1 
Las Vegas–Paradise NV MSA 5.9 
Boulder CO MSA 5.9 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria DC-VA-MD-WV MSA 5.7 
Eugene-Springfield OR MSA 5.5 
                                                 
15 New York Times Magazine, “Who Needs the Mortgage-Interest Deduction?” March 5, 2006. 
16 Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies, State of the Nation’s Housing 2007, May 2007. 
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Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH MSA 5.4 
Providence-New Bedford–Fall River RI-MA MSA 5.3 
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton OR-WA MSA 5.3 
Tucson AZ MSA 5.3 
Cape Coral–Fort Myers FL MSA 5.2 
Orlando FL MSA 5.2 
New Haven–Milford CT MSA 5 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet IL-IN-WI MSA 4.9 
Milwaukee-Waukesha–West Allis WI MSA 4.8 
Tampa–St. Petersburg–Clearwater FL MSA 4.8 
Portland–South Portland–Biddeford ME MSA 4.7 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale AZ MSA 4.7 
National Average 4.6 
Notes: Median House Price/Median Household Income Ratio;, metropolitan affordability table, ranked (29 MSAs 
above national average of 4.6, among 105 MSAs) 
Source: 2006 statistics, reported in Joint Center for Housing Studies’ State of the Nation’s Housing 2007. 
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III. Policy Inventory 
Affordable and long-term housing policies use three major types of delivery vehicles: (1) 
financial mechanisms (e.g., subsidies, grants, deductions, abatements, credits, below-market 
financing), (2) deed restrictions, and (3) land use regulations (i.e., zoning). Most programs 
use combinations of the three vehicles. Units can be rental (R) or homeownership (HO) in 
nature, depending on the municipality. A number of reports look at these strategies in greater 
detail.17 A matrix of these policies can be found in the appendix. 
Delivery Mechanisms for Affordable Housing Policy 
Operating Subsidies and Financing (R, HO) 
Below-market financing or a subsidy is generally what makes affordable housing affordable. 
The financing package subsidizes construction and/or operation. Conventional affordable-
housing programs provide operating subsidies or financing for a fixed term. Long-term 
programs extend conventional terms or are built to operate for longer tenures. Homeowner-
ship programs subsidize units up front. Programs with the goal of long-term homeownership 
use equity sharing to cap owner equity and to recapture or retain affordability for subsequent 
buyers.  
Deed Restrictions, Restrictive Covenants (R, HO) 
Deed restrictions are the legal restrictions placed on affordable units of all kinds that mandate 
occupant income restrictions, affordability tenures, and other regulations. Restrictive cove-
nants must be followed in order to gain and retain title to a restricted unit. Because deed 
restrictions must be closely monitored, especially for long-term programs, it is best to fund a 
monitoring agency in conjunction with the program, and even a title agency as well.  
Within a deed restriction, a sponsoring agency can reserve the legal right to object to a sale. 
Rights of First Refusal (ROFR) grant the local housing agency (or other contracted non-
profit) the right to oversee each transaction and approve both parties, throughout the tenure 
of a unit’s regulated life. This condition — that a transaction can be challenged if the new 
owner does not fit the target population — implicitly strengthens the restriction. Little data 
exists on how frequently ROFRs are exercised in practice. 
Land Regulation (R, HO) 
Most broadly, zoning (and, more commonly, inclusionary zoning) specifies what land can be 
used for residential development and can contain mandates and incentives for affordable 
                                                 
17 Rick Jacobus and Jeffrey Lubbell, “Preservation of Affordable Homeownership: A Continuum of Strategies,” 
NHC April 2007; John Emmeus Davis, “Shared Equity Homeownership: The Changing Landscape of Resale-
Restricted, Owner-Occupied Housing,” NHI 2006; Brad Lander, “Concept Paper: Creating Permanently 
Affordable Homeownership from New York City’s Inclusionary Zoning Program,” Pratt Center for Community 
Development, August 2006; Greg deGiere, “Permanently Affordable Housing,” California State Senate Office 
of Research, January 2003; Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development, “Moving Toward 
Permanent Affordability,” April 2007. 
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housing. Detailed zoning is a mechanism used in hot markets that increases land value by 
limiting development densities.18 
Subsidies and Equity Sharing 
Rent Subsidies (R) 
Although outside the focus of this paper, Section 8 rental vouchers deserve mention as the 
archetypal rent subsidy program, utilized nationwide, that many housing policymakers 
consider the best source of long-term affordable housing. The vouchers are made available 
through all levels of housing agencies. Some municipalities have developed other local 
voucher programs modeled on Section 8 for more specific populations, such as the homeless. 
As the cost of subsidizing vouchers to fill the gap between occupants’ very-low or low 
income and the market is costly, Section 8 is losing funding per capita. 
Shared Equity (HO) 
Shared-appreciation mortgages and shared-equity mortgages are the main financial products 
that deliver shared equity to an individual homebuyer while keeping the unit affordable to a 
subsequent buyer and preserving continuing affordability in perpetuity. New advancements 
in shared equity extend to preferring subsidy retention over subsidy recapture, in order to 
make the original subsidy grow with housing cost increases while also earning appreciation 
for the homeowner. Traditional housing value appreciates and builds the homeowner’s 
equity, whereas in a shared-equity partnership, the buyer’s capacity for appreciation is 
limited. In the recapture model, the exact amount of the public funds used to initially make 
the unit affordable is recaptured when the unit is sold. In hot markets, the initial funds may 
not be enough to keep the unit affordable to subsequent buyers. Subsidy retention solves the 
recapture model fund shortage by allowing the public funds to appreciate with the property, 
to keep the unit affordable to future buyers. 
Nonetheless, shared equity is contentious as some policymakers argue that limiting equity 
requires taking part in a complex program for little more return than a rental. Shared equity 
caps and indices have been a prolific area of policy research in 2006 and 2007. Rather than 
picking a fixed cap rate, many reports suggest the merit of tying equity caps to AMI growth, 
which has grown at least 3.35 percent in every seven-year period since the 1950s.19 Shared 
equity can also help troubled borrowers provide returns for curative gap capital. Shared-
equity mechanisms are a growing area of interest today. 
                                                 
18 Edward Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko, “The Impact of Building Restrictions on Housing Affordability,” 
Economic Policy Review, June 2003. 
19 Brad Lander, “Concept Paper: Creating Permanently Affordable Homeownership from New York City’s 
Inclusionary Zoning Program,” Pratt Center for Community Development, August 2006; “Preservation of 
Affordable Homeownership: A Continuum of Strategies,” NHC April 2007, p. 40. 
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Cooperatives and Community Governance 
Limited-Equity Cooperatives (HO) 
Limited-equity coops (LECs) are generally the least costly form of homeownership. Market-
rate coops and LECs are most common in Washington, DC, and New York City. In a coop, 
residents join to form a property tax–paying cooperative. Each resident owns a share of the 
building and land (or the building on long-term leased land) and pays a proportional share of 
its mortgage and taxes. In this way each member receives the homeownership mortgage-
interest tax deduction. Because the share is personal property and not real property, there are 
no real estate transaction fees when a resident leaves the coop and ownership shares change 
hands. LEC residents recover their initial share of the investment plus simple interest (capped 
at 10 percent annually). While they prevent subsidized homeowners from capturing great 
increases in the value of their homes when the market goes up, LECs also shield members 
from great losses if the market goes down. Also, by keeping housing prices low, they allow 
some low-income homeowners to diversify their holdings with other investments. Despite 
their complexity, LECs lose their affordability unless the limited-equity provisions are 
structured for perpetuity and monitored. Coops have also lost popularity in recent years, LEC 
formation having peaked in the 1980s and 1990s. Single-family houses and condos have 
become more common typologies for both market-rate and affordable housing. 
Mutual Housing Associations (HO, R) 
Subsidized, affordable Mutual Housing Associations (MHAs) are nonprofit associations that 
govern initial subsidies and determine income qualifications and terms of affordability. An 
association’s board is made up of tenants, lenders and local government representatives. As 
with an LEC, members enjoy the benefits of homeownership through personal investment in 
the association, but without the use of shares. In practice, initial subsidies are sometimes 
insufficient for maintenance and replacement reserves sufficient for long-term affordability.  
Community Land Trusts (HO, R) 
In a community land trust (CLT), a tax-exempt, nonprofit membership organization owns the 
land, and residents and other community members can invest as members. Residents, 
housing coops or mutual housing associations own the buildings separately and have the 
rights to use the land. As in an MHA, governance is through a board composed of residents, 
community members, public agency representatives and business professionals. As in an 
LEC, these require ongoing monitoring and technical assistance; unlike LECs they are 
usually used to make owner-occupied, single-family homes permanently affordable to 
homeowners, and can also be structured as rentals. CLTs are similar to other land trusts, 
which use land for conservation and recreational functions. 
Land Regulation 
Inclusionary Zoning (HO, R) 
Inclusionary zoning (or inclusionary housing) is a land use regulation that requires or 
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incentivizes developers to build an affordable percentage (generally five to 25 percent) for 
projects above a minimum size threshold. Ordinances can be mandatory or voluntary, on-site 
or off-site, and vary considerably in required affordability tenures. Voluntary programs 
frequently offer a density bonus, more rapid permitting, or additional financing options. 
Some states (e.g., Massachusetts, California and New Jersey) require localities to fulfill 
inclusionary measures, which are intended to create and sustain mixed-income communities 
or buildings, or to keep workforce employees near the schools or precincts where they work. 
However, many ordinances offer off-site provisions or let developers opt instead to 
contribute to a local housing trust fund. Inclusionary policies have existed since the late 
1970s in California and Maryland, but have become more effective since 2000 at producing 
tens of thousands of units nationwide. Growing interest in inclusionary zoning in scale and 
long-term provisions constitute the policy focus of this paper, as discussed in the next 
section. 
Extending Existing Termed Programs 
Use Agreement Options (HO, R) 
Exemptions from the real estate or income taxes that a developer usually pays are among the 
existing ways that conventional affordable housing is made affordable. These restricted “use 
agreement” options allow a municipality to opt out of taxes or market financing on to fulfill 
its policy choice to forgo a tax in exchange in order to encourage development of affordable 
housing.20 Real estate tax exemptions are a common and conventional mechanism to support 
affordable housing. Long-term use agreement options continue these arrangements in 
perpetuity. Advocates of long-term exemptions would like to see them zoned around transit 
hubs, as with inclusionary zoning, to create mixed-use, affordable “old urbanism” districts. 
As with exemptions today, they could be delivered in the form of tax exemptions to form the 
basis for eligible units through abatements, tax credits, subsidized loans, extended financing 
to limit debt service payments, impact fee exemptions, or nonamortizing loans.  
Amassing Funds to Sustain Affordable Housing 
Impact Fees, Exactions, and Housing Trust Funds (HO, R) 
A final topic to note is the use of housing trust funds to fund long-term affordable housing. 
Unlike the aforementioned strategies that directly maintain housing affordability, creating a 
long-term housing trust fund is a means for collecting funds and then distributing or 
redistributing them for specific projects or uses. The funds generally come from impact fees 
and exactions per square foot of development, and can then be directed to keep affordable 
housing affordable for the long term, provide gap financing between unit occupants or for 
low- or very-low-income occupants, or even to recapitalize existing projects in need of 
improvements.  
 
                                                 
20 Interview with Aileen Gribbin, Forsyth Street Advisors, New York City, May 10, 2007. 
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IV. Policy Focus: Inclusionary Zoning 
Inclusionary zoning has become a popular vehicle for providing regulated affordable housing 
for terms of upwards of 40 years or permanently. A supply-side, hot-market strategy, a 
specified percentage of the development (usually five to 25 percent) is developed as 
affordable. These affordable set-asides may be mandated or part of a voluntary bonus. IZ has 
precedents in land-use regulation (zoning), deed restrictions, public-private partnerships, 
mixed-income communities, impact fees, exactions and housing trust funds. By tailoring 
combinations of these provisions in localities and states, inclusionary ordinances produce 
public-private partnerships on a large scale, wherein developers get development rights and 
sometimes extra density, more rapid permitting, or more attractive financing in exchange for 
building affordable housing.  
Inclusionary zoning has attracted a good deal of attention. Physically, it is attractive to 
planners, and it works in both suburbs and major cities. Rather than designating individual 
sites as affordable, zoning a percentage of parcels for partial affordability appears seamless 
and invisible, as well as providing a means to generate mixed-income communities. Unlike 
other housing policies, IZ uses a cheap municipal resource that is hypothetically in great 
supply: additional density floor area ratio (FAR). Additional development rights are an 
incentive to developers to continue giving in perpetuity, and are a good exchange for 
affordable building in perpetuity. But housing policymakers warn that IZ is not the panacea 
that advocates presume, as the discussion below indicates.  
Literature on Inclusionary Zoning 
Inclusionary zoning regained the attention of the policy community between 2001 and 2004, 
when many large cities were considering ordinances. Boston, Denver and San Francisco 
already had mandatory inclusionary provisions. In 2006 and 2007, state and national think 
tanks wrote more papers extolling the productivity of inclusionary zoning, especially in 
California and the suburbs of Washington, DC.21 Developers and realty organizations 
responded with warnings that IZ taxes developers, raises surrounding housing prices, and in 
some cases excludes housing development.22 In 2007, the Furman Center for Real Estate and 
Urban Policy at New York University published the first nonpartisan, empirical study of 
inclusionary policies, which noted that inclusionary policies are a disparate group despite 
nominal similarities. In addition, while the number of inclusionary units produced has been 
steadily increasing, the ordinances that bring them about have also been regularly revised, on 
                                                 
21 Non-Profit Housing Association of Northern California, Affordable By Choice: Trends in California's 
Inclusionary Housing Programs, August 14, 2007; Earlier IZ bibliography at PolicyLink,  
www.policylink.org/EDTK/IZ/resources.html and BPI www.bpichicago.org/rah/rihi_pubs.html.  
22 National Association of Home Builders, The Myths and Facts about Inclusionary Zoning, September 2006, 
www.nahb.org/fileUpload_details.aspx?contentTypeID=3&contentID=63298&subContentID=81857; National 
Association of Realtors Resources, www.realtor.org/libweb.nsf/pages/fg806.  
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average every five years, in order to harness the level of productivity in the local housing 
market more effectively.23 
Housing policy professionals and developers both laud and criticize inclusionary zoning. On 
the plus side, IZ policies allow neighborhoods, cities and states to begin to think of or sell 
themselves as affordable to a certain extent, although few cities know precisely what 
percentage of their housing can be so designated. Inclusionary zoning clearly needs 
oversight, as well as frequent injections of additional financing to attract development and 
sustain affordability.  
Models of Inclusionary Zoning 
As the Furman study finds, an important point to make about inclusionary ordinances is that 
they appear to have very little in common. The most basic distinction is whether a designated 
affordable percentage is mandatory or voluntary. There are five basic models of inclusionary 
zoning: 
• Mandatory with no exemptions, buyouts or offset options 
• Mandatory with exemptions (e.g., projects with over 50 units) 
• Mandatory with cost offsets (e.g., extra market-rate density bonus) 
• Mandatory with buyout options (e.g., paying into a housing trust fund) 
• Voluntary with cost offsets  
 
The first case, in which mandatory inclusionary zoning functions as a tax on development, is 
extremely uncommon. An example would be a municipality building its affordability require-
ment into its existing height and massing restrictions, effectively charging an affordable 
housing FAR “tax” on developers. Most inclusionary policies instead employ some incentive 
system, frequently a density bonus greater than the required or optional affordable housing, 
or provide alternatives, such as a minimum project threshold size.  
Unlike subsidy and finance packages used with older affordable housing, density bonuses are 
municipal resources that provide a valuable incentive in perpetuity in exchange for providing 
permanent affordable housing. Off-site options to develop affordable housing, exactions per 
square foot going into a housing trust fund, or donating land for future affordable housing are 
the most common buyout alternatives.  
Scale Production  
Inclusionary ordinances were first created in the mid-1970s, but have just begun producing in 
scale during the last few years. Mandatory programs produced 11,000 units nationwide 
                                                 
23 Jenny Schuetz, et al., “The Effects of Inclusionary Zoning on Local Housing Markets,” NYU Furman Center 
for Real Estate and Urban Policy, 2007. 
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between 2003 and 2006, out of a total of 45,800 units created since inclusionary programs 
began.24 
Advocates Prefer Mandatory Programs 
By 2003, California had created 34,000 units of affordable housing through 101 mandatory 
IZ programs,25 while 105 voluntary programs in Massachusetts had created only 1,000 units. 
This disparity has led housing advocates to favor mandatory programs, and several cities 
have switched to mandatory IZ as a result, including Cambridge, MA, Boulder, CO, and 
Pleasanton and Irvine, CA.26 
Developers Prefer Voluntary Programs 
Mandatory IZ is effectively a tax on developers, while an incentive program provides a 
greater density bonus (subsidy) than does an affordability requirement (tax). In both models, 
market units cross-subsidize affordable units and the density bonus functions as a subsidy 
that is directly calculable in rent per square foot. Voluntary programs generally yield a larger 
bonus than an affordability requirement, giving developers a net subsidy. Frequently manda-
tory programs have no financial incentive besides allowing a developer to enter a very hot 
housing market such as the San Francisco Bay area or suburban Washington, DC. Lowering 
the barrier to entry, however, can be a valuable benefit to many smaller developers. 
Regulated Tenure 
Tenure under IZ moves the responsibility for legal regulation of affordable housing to zoning 
commissions rather than housing or financing agencies. In the case of Washington, DC, its 
commission chose to extend the whole program tenure to a permanent basis rather than have 
to revisit individual projects in the future.27 Washington’s precedent was the Moderately 
Priced Dwelling Unit (MPDU) program in suburban Montgomery County, MD, which 
extended its required regulated affordability in 2005 after most units had been sold out of the 
program at market prices. Tenures vary with local politics, but are increasingly being 
amended and extended. Washington, DC, and New York City use the word “permanence” in 
their ordinances, but define it as income restrictions for the life of the building. Other 
jurisdictions mandate specific tenures. Figure 2 shows tenures from around the country in 
2004. 
                                                 
24 Association of Neighborhood Housing Developers (NYC), “Moving Toward Permanent Affordability,” 
April 25, 2007. 
25 Non-Profit Housing of Northern California and the California Coalition for Rural Housing, 2003. 
26 Fannie Mae Foundation, “Easing the Affordability Crunch: The Inclusionary Housing Option,” August 2006, 
www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hff/v8i1-inclusionary.shtml.  
27 Interview with Ellen McCarthy, former director of the Office of Planning, Washington, DC, August 25, 2007. 
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Figure 2: Required Affordability Tenure for Inclusionary Policies (State and Local), 2004 
 
Source: Business and Professional People for the Public Interest, 2003, 2004. 
Arguments Against Inclusionary Programs 
A 2006 National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) report makes the case that all forms 
of inclusionary zoning essentially tax developers or neighboring residents in order to 
subsidize the lucky few.28 Most of the subjects of the developer interviews conducted for this 
paper, however, are in favor of well-structured voluntary inclusionary programs that give 
incentives to developers, such as that of New York City. Economically, the NAHB argument 
is valid, in that mandatory IZ functions like a tithing. If a developer opts not to build in a 
jurisdiction because the market there is slow, then mandatory IZ is effectively exclusionary 
and counterproductive. 
Both for-profit developer leaders with experience building affordable housing and national 
housing policy directors were interviewed for this paper. Input from developers, as from 
policymakers, falls across the spectrum of support. Some are against shared-equity arrange-
                                                 
28 National Association of Home Builders, “The Myths and Facts about Inclusionary Zoning,” 2006. 
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ments, which homeownership through inclusionary zoning frequently involves, and believe 
that current policies have lost sight of the mission of affordable housing to build equity. More 
frequently, developers welcome the opportunity to build affordable housing whenever and 
wherever it can break even.  
Input from Developers 
On Inclusionary Zoning 
Despite the NAHB argument against IZ, the Urban Land Institute (ULI), an influential 
national real estate development organization, started a new initiative for workforce housing 
in 2007. The ULI Terwilliger Center for Workforce Housing’s benefactor and former ULI 
chairman, J. Ronald Terwilliger (CEO of Trammell Crow Residential, one of the nation’s 
largest housing developers) actually advocated for mandatory inclusionary zoning as “one of 
the most effective tools to get affordable housing built” in a speech announcing the new ULI 
center and initiative.29 This is an unprecedented statement from such a large developer to an 
organizational constituency of other large, for-profit developers. His $5 million donation, the 
largest ever made to the ULI, will be used to educate regional members and to spur develop-
ment of 3,500 units of workforce housing, for households between 60 and 120 percent of 
AMI, in Atlanta, Southeast Florida and Washington, DC. 
In general, developers tend to favor voluntary IZ. One described mandatory IZ as an unfair, 
industry-specific tax, pointing out that car manufacturers are not required to build extra cars 
and sell them below market to people with low incomes. Others felt that mandatory IZ could 
be a worthwhile entry ticket into certain profitable housing markets that would otherwise be 
difficult to enter. 
On Long-Term Affordability 
In California, long-term affordability is the norm: as projects financed with LIHTC bonds 
require a minimum of 55 years of affordability. California, enabled by its extremely hot 
housing market, is clearly a national leader in affordable longevity. The state is also a leader 
in adopting local inclusionary ordinances and producing units. A recent report found that by 
June 2006, 170 California jurisdictions with inclusionary policies had produced 29,281 units 
in the seven-year period since 1999.30 Many municipalities have also recently amended their 
regulations to adopt permanent affordability.  
California may be a role model for the rest of the country, but the state also has the signifi-
cant advantage of being able to harness one of the most consistently hot markets of the last 
decade. The country’s hottest housing markets are also the country’s least affordable, as 
shown in Figure 1. Inclusionary zoning is an attractive tool for communities and local 
                                                 
29 Urban Land Institute, “Former ULI Chairman J. Ronald Terwilliger Provides $5 Million to Fund ULI 
Terwilliger Center For Workforce Housing,” February 1, 2007, www.uli.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section= 
Home&CONTENTID=81968&TEMPLATE=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm. 
30 NPH, August 14, 2007. It also reports that 80,000 people have been housed in California inclusionary 
programs to date, though not distinctly between 1999 and 2006. 
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governments in hot housing markets to promote social equity through the strength of the 
market. 
On the East Coast, where long-term programs are less common and geographically smaller, 
some developers claim that long-term shared equity homeownership is a bad deal for 
unsophisticated homeowners. One developer suggested that homebuyers invest in certificates 
of deposit (CDs) instead, since they would yield a higher return.  
Example: Inclusionary Zoning in New York City 
New York City’s improved 2004 IZ revision now involves five neighborhoods. Developers 
and housing advocates laud Commissioner Shaun Donovan for skillfully tapping the 
knowledge of area developers and nonprofits with an ordinance that attracts profitable 
affordable housing development. The New York City voluntary IZ ordinance gives a 33 
percent density bonus as-of-right in exchange for requiring 20 percent affordability for the 
life of a project. The result is a 13 percent bonus of market-rate density in exchange for 
participating in the city’s inclusionary program. The ordinance was written with the 
realization that in the city’s hot market of the last several decades, this bonus space will 
make it more profitable to develop inclusionary housing. In New York City, inclusionary 
housing is one of several bonuses associated with the city’s intricate and extensive zoning 
resolutions. Other precedents include community facilities, privately built public parks, 
plazas and arcades, and even theater preservation. 
Voluntary Density Bonus Structuring 
New York City housing policymakers have contentions with several areas of the ordinance 
despite the enthusiasm of developers. In the rezoning of Greenpoint-Williamsburg, the first 
outer-borough neighborhood to be zoned on an inclusionary basis (in 2004), advocates 
charge that the inclusionary ordinance gives away density bonuses rather than calculating for 
density profitability; that is, that the city simply decided how much extra density was suitable 
for the inclusionary parcels, rather than picking a target internal rate of return (IRR) and 
calculating backwards, using prevailing prices per square foot, to determine how much extra 
density bonus to award. Advocates claim that modeling proposed densities, particularly for 
the yet-finalized Hudson Yards midtown Manhattan business district extension, yields 
extreme densities while giving developers excessive profits. Had the city built from 
profitability upward, advocates claim, it could have given away much less density based on 
home sales rates per square foot since 2004.31 
                                                 
31 Aaron Yowell, et al., “Inclusionary Zoning for New York City: Predictions and Recommendations for 
Hudson Yards, Greenpoint-Williamsburg, and Beyond,” Wagner Policy Review, vol. 14, 2007. 
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Considering Homeownership 
New York City’s inclusionary zoning resolution notably includes no homeownership provi-
sion, although one has been under development unofficially for years. Local nonprofits, 
particularly the Pratt Institute Center for Community and Economic Development, which 
previously partnered with PolicyLink to write influential inclusionary zoning studies that 
influenced Washington, DC’s, ordinance development in 2004,32 have suggested adopting 
Jacobus’s community land trust model and pegging equity appreciation to area median 
income growth.33 However, the City Department of Housing Preservation and Development 
(HPD), rather than producing a public answer or an official equity-sharing arrangement, so 
far has permanent income restrictions for rental units produced under inclusionary zoning.  
Tracking Performance 
At this time New York City’s inclusionary zoning program has been considered too new to 
track. HPD does know that the program produced 300 units in 2006; however, it does not 
know the number or percentage of developers on eligible sites that opt in or out of 
inclusionary affordable housing.34 Despite having produced a small number of the 18,000 
units that HPD built in 2006, IZ is an exception in the context of the city’s New Housing 
Marketplace Plan (set to build 165,000 affordable units by 2013), which is assembling 
aggressive unit production quotas for a number of other housing production programs. The 
IZ program does seem promising: 300 units in five neighborhoods is more than Washington, 
DC’s, annual goal of 170 units.35  
Example: Chicago Community Land Trust 
In 2006, Chicago became the first city government in a large, hot market to start and run a 
community land trust. As of 2008, it has 250 units in the pipeline, and a plan for 1,000 total 
units. If it reaches its projection, it would be larger than the Champlain Housing Trust 
(formerly the Burlington Community Land Trust), the most well known in the nation, which 
has 650 units. The Chicago municipal CLT is the first sign that the CLT model is ready for 
mass production in a hot urban market and can be run feasibly through the collaboration of 
city housing agency staff and a nonprofit board, rather than a municipally funded nonprofit. 
Through this initiative, the Chicago CLT was able to forgo nonprofit setup and administra-
tion hurdles, as well as unit construction, since it is taking affordable units already being 
built by other city programs and adding them to the community land trust.  
There is excitement about CLTs in the housing world for two main reasons: (1) they have 
separated landownership from homeownership (owned by separate community 
organizations), thus (2) making single-family homeownership units that will sustain 
                                                 
32 Interview with Ellen McCarthy. 
33 Brad Lander, Pratt Center for Community and Economic Development, August 2006. 
34 Interview with Arden Sokolow, director of Inclusionary Zoning, NYC HPD, July 2007. 
35 Washington, DC, Office of Planning, “Initial Impact Analysis of IZ Mapping,” September 25, 2006. 
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affordability through successive owners using initial subsidies for perpetuity. CLT 
innovators, primarily Rick Jacobus, deserve credit for championing the long-term, shared-
equity homeownership model that other delivery systems, such as homeownership 
inclusionary zoning in Washington, DC, are now implementing though other mechanisms in 
addition to CLTs.36  
CLTs are increasing today. The number of CLTs in the U.S. has doubled since 2001 to over 
200. As of late 2006, however, they have only produced about 6,500 units of housing 
nationwide since 1968.37 Most CLTs involve about 50 units, composed of single-family 
houses, and in medium to hot northeastern markets.38 The Chicago CLT is an anomaly in 
administration and scale. Success in Chicago, or Westchester County, NY (which began in 
2007), could make this model more attractive to hotter market cities. Scale and location is 
central in evaluating CLTs. Local governments should take note of Chicago’s CLT to see if 
operating one on a larger scale is feasible for municipalities in the hottest urban markets.  
                                                 
36 Interview with Ellen McCarthy. 
37 Gregory Ingram, “Report from the President: Community Land Trusts,” Lincoln Institute of Land Policy: 
Land Lines, October 2007. 
38 Yesim Sungu-Eryilmax and Rosalind Greenstein, “A National Study of Community Land Trusts,” Lincoln 
Institute of Land Policy, 2007. 
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V. Findings: Inherent Challenges, Tensions and Trade-Offs 
Expert Innovation vs. Expert Skepticism 
Developers’ skepticism of shared-equity homeownership leads to a stalemate similar to 
policy professionals’ applause for Section 8. Housing policymakers have spent the past 
decade coming up with new and unorthodox funding sources: density bonuses, advanced 
legal restrictions, partnerships with developers, and equity from new homeowners. Despite 
the promise of these creative funding streams, these innovations do not equitably replace the 
present dearth of federal affordable-housing subsidies.  
Lacking federal support, housing policymakers have worked to find the best balance between 
equity building, subsidy retention and financial mortgage products that are safe and desirable 
for unsophisticated homebuyers and investors alike. Despite these advances, with more 
sophisticated aspirations and less financial backing per capita, today’s tools for providing 
affordable housing remain a set of “pragmatic approach[es]… to a set of utopian aspira-
tions,”39 a critique also made of LECs in the past. It is easy to be skeptical of today’s 
prospects for long-term affordable homeownership. One developer blamed the “me 
generation” for fewer housing subsidies and blamed policymakers for losing sight of HUD’s 
original goals. But with fewer subsidies for affordable housing today, and longer-regulated 
longevities sought, there is no perfect balance. Homeownership usually offers shelter, 
stability and equity. Long-term affordable options seem destined to offer fewer benefits, 
given less equity.  
Unit Production vs. Target Affordability vs. Regulated Term vs. Equity Building 
Like increases in the homeownership rate, high unit production tends to get the best press. 
Policy reports that laud high unit creation in their findings, however, do not register other 
equitable affordable-housing production outcomes. Creating a large number of units may 
come at the expense of reaching households with lower incomes and creating units with 
longer-regulated tenures, and may also render housing trust funds smaller for future 
financing or recapitalization, or may lack adequate program oversight, as depicted in 
Figure 3. 
                                                 
39 Duncan Kennedy, “The Limited Equity Cooperative as a Vehicle for Affordable Housing in a Race and Class 
Divided Society,” Howard Law Journal, vol. 46, 2002, p. 86. 
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Figure 3: Local Affordable Housing Expenditure Tensions 
 
 
To illustrate these trade-offs, consider a municipality that is comparing IZ to CLTs in order 
to produce long-term affordable homeownership. To date, municipalities have found IZ 
much more flexible. It doesn’t require buying land, and the Furman Center has found that 
most municipalities alter their ordinance about every five years. The outcome of many of 
these inclusionary alterations is longer affordable tenures, but perhaps these changes come at 
the expense of reaching lower-income households or of building equity for new homeowners. 
Long-term affordability policies seek to stretch limited resources. The most full-featured 
policies require municipalities to make significant investments. 
Political Saliency 
While long-term affordable housing mechanisms certainly go beyond the scope of a political 
term and can leave a salient legacy, the long-term aspect of a local program may be less 
salient for some politicians than creating more units, increasing overall levels of home-
ownership, or helping constituents with the greatest financial need. Given that long tenure 
may be in financial conflict with other housing needs that can be accomplished immediately 
— and taken credit for, long-term programs are likely to continue to find difficulty garnering 
political backing.  
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Ensuring Housing Trust Fund Results 
The Furman Center has found that many cities require less money to be given to housing 
trust funds than would ordinarily be required to build a new unit.40 This complicates 
arguments for inclusionary zoning. The public sector needs more transparent accountability 
regarding housing trust funds. Their expenditures are also more complicated because units 
may be more costly overall than the developer may have anticipated, due to factors such as 
provision of a longer tenure, a greater subsidy to meet lower income requirements, or 
provision of gap financing to keep an existing unit affordable. This is especially important to 
consider as Congress considers legislation to create a national housing trust fund.  
Homeownership Issues 
Consequences of Emphasis on Homeownership  
Because the IRS awards homeownership with one of its biggest tax deductions, encouraging 
homeownership investment encourages liquidity in the economy. Individuals and politicians 
alike see it as an unquestioned American goal. The predatory-lending crisis clearly raises 
flags that this goal should be questioned, especially for low-income buyers.  
Shared equity for low-income buyers, however, is stable and sustainable. As an added perk, 
shared-equity homeowners also qualify for the homeownership tax deduction. This may not 
be worth much to them, but they do get most of the advantages of homeownership, including 
a safe investment with stable appreciation.  
Homeownership Trends: Condominiums and Houses Favored Over Co-ops 
Homeowners want the equity and asset of a mortgage that enables them to refinance and “use 
their house like an ATM.” This is a big reason that condos have much greater market share in 
multifamily buildings than coops, both in the present and the probable future. Given the 
decreasing market preference for coops, IZ and CLTs are replacing LECs.41  
Finding the Right Amount of Shared Equity for Homeownership Mechanisms  
Shared equity is the current hot-button homeownership issue. Policymakers who make use of 
it need to decide how much appreciation is enough to maintain the unit for the next buyer, 
and how much is enough to make it a good investment by the homeowner. Ultimately, not all 
goals can be addressed at the same time. The National Housing Conference papers on shared 
equity (2007) recommend subsidy retention wherein the original subsidy is recaptured plus a 
share of the appreciation, as in Figure 4 (below). 
 
                                                 
40 Shuetz, et al. 2007, p. 9, citing California Coalition 2003, Brown 2001, Rubin, et al. 1990, Hughes and 
McGuire 1991. 
41 Interview with Jim Gray. 
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Figure 4: Shared Equity Maintains Unit Affordability and Builds Limited Wealth 
 
Note: Image based on Rick Jacobus and Jeffrey Lubbell, “Preservation of Affordable Homeownership: A 
Continuum of Strategies,” National Housing Conference/Center for Housing Policy: April 2007. 
To consider a case of how to choose an equity-sharing model, New York City housing 
advocates have been suggesting various models to the city’s HPD in the hope that it will 
introduce an IZ homeownership program. In 2006 the Pratt Center for Community 
Development recommended using Rick Jacobus’s CLT model and tying appreciation to AMI 
growth (rather than 5 percent per year on equity), and to share 25 percent of appreciation 
with the homeowner.42 The model favors sustainability over substantial asset building for 
homebuyers, but offers them a house that is larger or has a better location than they would 
otherwise have been able to afford. This reflects the city housing agency’s concerns about 
what could happen if AMI decreases.43 
Redesigning a Framework for Upwardly Mobile Homeownership 
Creating a shared-equity program to match the politics and market of any locality that adopts 
the goal of long-term homeownership is a big undertaking. The lengths of many recent 
reports on shared equity attest to how challenging it can be to sell the concept of shared 
equity to homeowners, builders and leaders.  
What are the ultimate goals and how much equity is necessary to:  
…attract homebuyers?  
…create upwardly mobile homebuyers?  
                                                 
42 Brad Lander, “IZ Homeownership Concept Paper for NYC HPD,” Pratt Center for Community and 
Economic Development: August 2006. 
43 Interview with Arden Sokolow, July 2007. 
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…sustain affordability between owners?  
…convince homebuyers to maintain and improve their homes?  
Hypothetically, any share would help a responsible investor who lacks existing assets. But 
how much is necessary to make a good investment compared to other nonrisky investments, 
such as certificates of deposit?  
Increased Regulated Tenures 
Lengthening affordability creates some new questions for administering bodies about the 
most equitable uses of a limited number of affordable housing units. Should one occupant be 
able to keep a unit for his or her whole life, or should there be time limits for individual 
occupants in order to share a unit among many occupants? If a unit will eventually expire 
after an extended term, is the extension beneficial or is it just postponing the inevitable 
expiration — and pushing the search for replacement units to future administrators? Is 
extending tenure a good use of resources when those resources might be able to make a unit 
affordable to tenants with lower AMIs for a shorter period?  
Limits on Tenant Tenure? 
Whereas conventional affordability measures expire, long-term affordable housing allows 
municipalities to preserve their housing stocks potentially forever, while also enabling 
individual households to avoid displacement. Municipalities may not want to give individual 
households permanent benefits, or may want to limit their ability (as with rent control) to 
pass the unit on to others. In the long term, some municipalities may rethink their affordable 
housing philosophies.  
The “Year 99” Problem 
Postponing displacement under a long-term program does not avoid it. However, postpone-
ment does give municipalities time to establish more stable affordable-housing stocks. 
Localities can also decide whether to disallow developers from buying their way out of 
affordability terms prematurely. Nonetheless, some housing policymakers who were 
interviewed are skeptical of longer-term programs, perceiving them as only delaying 
inevitable displacement. They see the program term as being arbitrary if residents know 
about it in advance.  
Deepest Affordability vs. Longest Affordability 
For every ten units of public housing, a city could create 170 units of Section 8 housing.44 
For long-term programs, municipalities can choose subsidy sizes to reach households on 
lower to higher levels of the AMI scale that will make the affordability period longer or 
shorter. In localities with the hottest housing markets, such as California, these goals may not 
necessarily be in conflict with each other. 
                                                 
44 Interview with Jim Stockard, Commissioner, Cambridge (MA) Housing Authority, June 2007. 
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Shared Equity and Upward Mobility 
Learning About Limited-Equity Homeowners 
Researchers know less about affordability issues that involve homebuyers than those that 
involve renters. How do municipalities test how limited-equity homeownership and 
appreciation sharing affect asset building and upward mobility? Does the percentage of 
equity cap correlate with the upward mobility of low-income homeowners? How do 
municipalities judge the efficacy of limited-equity homeownership as an asset-building tool 
for low-AMI households? Researchers could work with municipalities to see how these 
particular homeowners invest, refinance, or even buy other real estate.  
Hypothetically, municipalities could prohibit refinancing and let limited-equity homeowners 
realize gains only upon selling, thus making it possible for other households to take advan-
tage of the unit. Opting to move is different from displacement. Given a nonexpiring 
homeownership unit with no individual tenure limit, homeowners would not be displaced. 
But would housing agencies want to create time limits for individual tenants?  
Flipping vs. Long-Term Affordability  
While “flipping” — fixing up a home and selling it for more in a short time span — is 
practically a professional sport in the normal market (even the focus of a reality television 
show)45, many housing policymakers and developers believe that it is a good way for new 
homebuyers to learn to build equity. Flipping yields appreciation for low-income home-
buyers. However, flipping cost Montgomery County thousands of the affordable housing 
units that it had successfully created during the first 25 years of the its Moderately Priced 
Dwelling Unit (MPDU) program, which is considered the first productive precursor to IZ 
policies. Its early-deed restrictions were set to five years in 1974, which was then revised to 
10 years in 1981 when few affordable units remained in the program. In 1999, only 3,500 of 
the 10,600 units that had been created were still affordable. In 2005, the county raised tenure 
to its present regulated status: 30 years for homeownership and 99 years for rental.46  
A third option is policies that incentivize ownership for five or 10 years. In most jurisdic-
tions, using a long-term regulated tenure as a deed restriction is the best way to retain and 
sustain affordability. When banks make loans or owners get titles, a nonprofit monitoring 
agency can also be contracted to approve the sale or exercise a right of first refusal. Using an 
equity escalator, which limits a house’s equity appreciation rate until a specified year of 
ownership, e.g., year five, a municipality can discourage flipping while still building equity 
appreciation. Resale data for long-term homeownership is limited, although a 2007 CLT 
                                                 
45 Flipping Out, with the subheader “Drama for Sale,” airs Tuesdays at 10 pm ET on Bravo, 
www.bravotv.com/Flipping_Out.  
46 John Emmeus Davis, “Shared Equity Homeownership,” NHI, 2006, quoting Karen Destorel Brown, 
“Expanding Affordable Housing Through Inclusionary Zoning: Lessons from the Washington Metropolitan 
Area,” Brookings, 2001. 
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study looks at home price resale calculations nationwide.47 Future studies could determine 
more information about owner tenures, equity building, and why owners leave. 
Designing an Inclusionary Ordinance 
Long-Term IZ: Mandatory vs. Voluntary 
Policy reports frequently recommend mandatory inclusionary policies over voluntary 
ordinances for their success in creating the most units. Mandatory policies have been more 
productive, but new research shows that there are so many other variables in inclusionary 
policies that generalizing about inclusionary policy is rarely useful.48 Voluntary policies, 
such as those of New York City, if zoned in on a larger scale, may be productive in bringing 
a long-term inclusionary policy to a city which is politically and economically less disposed 
to mandatory inclusionary ordinances. Following the trend of other municipalities that have 
started with voluntary and moved to mandatory policies in order to boost production of 
affordable units, a voluntary inclusionary policy is a productive way for a municipality to 
test-drive inclusionary zoning on a small scale, before choosing to implement it more 
aggressively.  
Structuring Density Bonus IRRs 
Structuring voluntary inclusionary ordinances is rarely a public process, yet the density 
bonus is the operative part of making a voluntary ordinance successful. Voluntary ordinances 
work in sophisticated markets despite the preference expressed in policy reports for a 
mandatory approach. Determining the amount of extra market-rate floor area to offer as a 
cost offset is best done by determining internal rates of return (IRRs) first, and then solving 
for the necessary density bonus. New York City offers 12 percent to 20 percent,49 while 
Seattle offers 14 percent.50 Developers tend to be more focused on IRRs, while city agencies 
focus more on costs.51  
Do Density Bonuses Lower Quality of Life? 
The primary negative aspect of inducing development of affordable housing through a 
density bonus is that, arguably, density can increase too much. In a suburban area this may be 
less notable, but in cities where tall buildings lining individual streets can form peaks and 
valleys in the urban streetscape, adding more density may harm historic context or lower the 
quality of life.  
                                                 
47 Sungu-Eryilmaz and Greenstein 2007. 
48 Shuetz 2007. 
49 Interview with Arden Sokolow of the NYC Housing Preservation and Development IZ unit, July 10, 2007. 
50 Bay Area Economics report, 2005. 
51 Interview with Ellen McCarthy. 
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 
There is no simple answer to the efficacy or success of long-term affordable housing 
programs. “Affordable housing” is still an unfamiliar term to most Americans eligible for it. 
So too is common terminology for longer regulation periods. Beyond simply raising the 
visibility of these programs, their application procedures and their limited tenures, housing 
providers and advocates want to know how to follow and implement leads like that of 
California elsewhere in the country. Current attempts to stretch municipal resources in hot 
housing markets to produce units that will survive decades of affordable homeownership 
meet both praise and skepticism. More cities are trying shared-equity strategies. Extended 
affordable-housing innovations have great promise to create sustainable affordable-housing 
products that will remain affordable for successive owners in hot markets. As greater 
numbers of these units go online, the next few years will show how low-income homebuyers, 
neighbors and developers react to these new housing options.  
Recommendations for Nonprofits 
Monitor To Ensure Long-Term Affordability and Accountability 
In order to maintain quality affordable housing through long tenures, nonprofits should 
advocate and work with municipalities to oversee that deed restrictions are met and that local 
housing trust funds are used to maintain or finance gaps. Ordinances that incorporate housing 
trust funds should also develop methods that ensure that exaction payments are made in 
amounts equal to the cost of building a physical unit.  
Recommendations for Municipalities and Local Governments 
Critical responsibilities for the local public sector include educating constituents about 
affordable housing and how to apply for it (and about concepts such as expiring affordability 
and use), determining the municipality’s percentage of affordability, and setting new 
citywide goals. Addressing these concerns will make the municipality more attractive to 
existing and potential residents, and more competitive with neighboring cities.  
Better Regulate Sources and Uses of Housing Trust Funds 
The amounts that developers put in housing trust funds should be the same as the amounts 
they would spend building units. There are, however, many other uses for the funds. To use 
them for gap financing or recapitalizing later in the tenure of affordable housing is 
recommended for all municipalities, particularly those intending to sustain affordable units 
longer than 20 years. Reaching tenants with lower incomes, making physical improvements, 
and sustaining units for longer terms are all marks of healthy ordinances that may “cost” 
building fewer units upfront, a point lost in many policy reports. 
Increase the Safety, Success and Longevity of First-Time Homeownership 
Politicians are celebrated for raising homeownership rates, but receive little blame for 
encouraging the factors which lead to foreclosures. Becoming a new homeowner is a great 
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achievement, but it is not suited to all buyers. The mortgage-interest tax deduction is a boon 
for homeowners with large incomes, but n empty promise for low earners. Regulated 
affordable-homeownership programs are a safer way to increase homeownership among 
lower- and moderate-income homeowners.  
Consider Input from Local Developers 
For-profit affordable housing developers build most of the affordable housing in the United 
States, yet they are infrequently consulted for input on ordinances, particularly local 
inclusionary zoning, that affect the way they build affordable housing. Developers 
interviewed for this paper unanimously agree that planning agencies should seek developer 
input when structuring inclusionary ordinances. Two main problems are that in public forums 
and task forces developers are frequently vilified, thus losing interest in participation52; and 
developers may be the object of backlash in their own communities for being perceived as 
contributing to an unpopular or mandatory inclusionary ordinance.53 To resolve these issues, 
and receive input from the developers likely to build under their ordinances, municipalities 
should convene a separate developer task force, led by a nonpartisan chairperson. 
Evaluate Long-Term Inclusionary Zoning  
Zoning commissions in large cities may prefer the idea of making inclusionary housing 
permanently affordable so as to simplify the need to review individual applications for 
regulated tenure revisions or extensions. The simplicity of using long-term blanket zoning is 
seductive for planners and policymakers. Such a decision should be made with close 
supervision from the city housing department regarding economic concerns, however. Such 
concerns as calculating whether the local market is hot enough to continue encouraging 
development, determining the costs of extended mechanisms to developers at present and in 
the future, and offering subsidies or financing to ease those barriers are as important as 
considering the policy itself.   
Monitor Inclusionary Effectiveness, Productivity and Longevity 
It is vital to track the success of inclusionary program and the efficacy of restrictive cove-
nants. It often takes years to create an ordinance, rewrite a city’s code, enable underlying 
legislation, and rezone neighborhoods with inclusionary zoning. All cities using voluntary 
programs should track the percentage of developers that opt in or out of inclusionary 
housing. At a later date they should use this information to re-examine the ordinance. It is 
equally important to see that affordable units are being filled by eligible people, in order to 
ensure that the appropriate income groups are being targeted.  
                                                 
52 Interview with Thomas Bozzuto, executive vice president of The Bozzuto Group, Greenbelt, MD, 
August 25, 2007. 
53 Interview with Ellen McCarthy. 
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Evaluate More Long-Term Affordable Housing Programs at More Levels of Government 
States interested in lobbying to adopt long-term, affordable rent-based programs such as 
California’s 55-year regulation period (up from 15 years in most states) on bond-financed 
LIHTC projects, New York State’s rent stabilization program for rentals under $2,000 per 
month, and Montgomery County, MD’s, 30-year affordable inclusionary homeownership 
program should evaluate the barriers to developing affordable housing in local markets. 
Competition for limited resources such as the state’s annual allocation of federal LIHTCs and 
the supply of parcels zoned for inclusionary programs should be compared to the financial 
benefits that the developer receives versus the tenure desired. For developers, advantages 
such as more rapid permitting, access to more subsidies, and parcels that make it easier to 
break into the housing development market can be necessary commodities. If the market is 
hot enough, decision-makers should determine the geographical regions where they can 
assemble the political will to extend existing resources, add new subsidies, or extend 
regulated tenure most productively.  
Recommendations for Policymakers and Researchers 
In order to help policymakers and affordable housing developers better structure their 
products and compete with potentially harmful market products such as subprime mortgages, 
it is important to determine what motivates homebuyers to choose long-term affordable-
housing options. 
Study Wealth-Building and Upward Mobility 
Comparing equity built among different categories of investments for low-income families 
over time — e.g., rental (the null case), certificates of deposit, long-term shared-equity 
affordable homeownership, Section 8 homeownership vouchers, limited-equity cooperatives, 
subprime and prime homeownership — facilitates determining the thresholds of the useful 
amount of equity for low-income families to start building. It would be helpful as well to 
determine the importance of other factors, such as education about approaches to building 
wealth and becoming a homeowner. 
Further research could investigate optimal tenures in affordable housing stays, from the 
standpoint of both homeowners and municipalities. Long-term affordable housing challenges 
the paradigm that families are forced out when the building’s regulated affordability expires. 
Instead, given a potentially infinite tenure, municipalities may choose to limit the amount of 
time that an individual family can benefit from the resource. In order for both families and 
municipalities to gain optimum benefit, researchers should study the time value of upward 
mobility in affordable housing. 
Recommendations for New York City 
Some recommendations follow based on interviews conducted in New York City for this 
paper.  
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Expand Voluntary Inclusionary Zoning 
New York City’s voluntary inclusionary ordinance is a model for other hot urban markets. It 
harnesses the sophistication of the city’s developers and housing policymakers, while not 
being as aggressive as inclusionary policies in several less hot urban markets. Developers 
around the country praise New York City’s IZ ordinance. Nevertheless, the ordinance should 
be rezoned into more city neighborhoods that are able to support it. Washington, DC’s, new 
IZ will cover the entire city. New York City has had IZ since the 1980s, but only the 2004 
revision is proving productive. It applies IZ to neighborhoods of varied densities in more 
diverse parts of the city and makes more financing available to developers. Unfortunately, 
the city HPD does not monitor it closely enough to track the policy’s performance. If most 
developers are opting in to build affordable housing — and at least some of them are doing it 
onsite — the ordinance will be more worthy of its praise. 
Track Success of Inclusionary Zoning 
The New York City HPD should track the percentage of eligible developers who opt in or out 
of IZ. It should also watch where those units are built, how far off-site, and whether they 
cluster. Under the current resolution, most will be built off-site on the cheapest sites within 
applicable community districts. Advocates charge, correctly, that this does not create the 
mixed-income communities that inclusionary zoning intends to promote, but instead creates 
pockets of lower wealth. As more neighborhoods are zoned according to IZ, the HPD should 
track longevity to see how long the “permanence” in the zoning code actually lasts. 
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Appendix: Long-Term Affordability Mechanism Matrix 
  Type     
  Demand-Side Supply-Side Mechanism Longevity 
  Individual Community City/State Federal Subsidy Legal Restriction Tested long-term? Example Locale(s) 
HOT MARKET              
Macro              
Operating Subsidies and Financing (R, HO) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes National, state HFAs, cities 
Deed Restrictions, Restrictive Covenants (R, HO)   Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes CLTs, IZ, LECs, MHAs, etc. 
Land Regulation (R, HO)    Yes  Maybe Yes Yes Yes All levels of jurisdictions
Mechanisms              
Rent Subsidies (R) Yes  Yes Yes Yes   Yes Section 8, NYC HSP 
Shared Equity (HO)   Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Burlington (VT), Chicago, etc. 
Limited-Equity Cooperatives (HO)   Yes Yes  Maybe  Yes Yes NYC, DC, NH 
Community Land Trusts (HO, R)   Yes Yes  Maybe Yes Maybe Yes Burlington (VT), Chicago, etc. 
Inclusionary Zoning (HO, R)    Yes  Maybe Yes Yes Yes CA, DC, NJ, MA, NYC 
Mutual Housing Associations (HO, R)   Yes   Maybe  Yes Yes CT 
Extending Existing Termed Programs              
Use Agreement Options (HO, R)    Yes  Yes Yes  No Short-term, extension possible 
Amassing Funds to Sustain Affordable Housing              
Impact Fees, Exactions and Housing Trust Funds 
(HO, R)   Yes Yes  Yes Yes Maybe Yes 
Short-term, extension 
possible 
COLD MARKET               
Market Homeownership Yes Yes         No Variable   
Market Rental Yes Yes         No No   
Note: Units can be rental (R) or homeownership (HO) in nature, depending on the municipality.
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